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Attorney Gen. v. Dist. Ct. (Philip Morris), 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 5 (Jan. 29, 2009)1
CONTRACT LAW – COMPELLING ARBITRATION
Summary
Petition for writ of mandamus challenging order granting motion to compel arbitration on
the basis that the contract’s arbitration clause does not include issues of enforcing qualifying
statutes within its scope and another part of the contract allows state courts to hear certain
breaches of contract.
Disposition/Outcome
Petition for writ of mandamus challenging order granting motion to compel arbitration
denied because enforcement of qualifying statutes is within the scope of the arbitration clause
and, therefore, does not fall under the court’s jurisdiction.
Factual and Procedural History
In 1998, Nevada entered into a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with tobacco
companies forcing tobacco companies to make an annual payment to the state in exchange for
the state’s agreement to not pursue litigation against them for smoking-related health-care costs.2
Under the MSA, the state would then have to enact and enforce a qualifying statute requiring
tobacco companies selling products within the state to either join the MSA or make payments
into a state escrow account.  Therefore, under the MSA, if a state does not enforce its qualifying
statute and an independent auditor determines the MSA is at least partially responsible for one of
the MSA companies’ decrease in profits, a MSA company can decrease its annual payment to a
state.
In 2006, the MSA tobacco companies alleged that Nevada did not enforce its qualifying
statute in 2003 and therefore the MSA tobacco companies lost profits during that year to non-
MSA tobacco companies.  The MSA tobacco companies than withheld millions of dollars from
their 2006 annual payment to Nevada.  The state of Nevada filed a complaint asking the district
court to determine that the state had enforced its qualifying statute and, therefore, the MSA
companies must pay the full 2006 payment. The MSA companies answered the complaint with a
motion to compel arbitration which the district court awarded under the terms of the MSA.
Discussion
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to protect petitioners when they will not
have access to an appeal and when there is a clear abuse of discretion or when a tribunal is not
correctly applying the law.3
1 By Miranda Mahe.
2 Nevada joined 45 other states in agreeing to the MSA.
3 Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-604, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981); Puolos v. Dist.
Ct., 98 Nev. 453, 455, 652 P.2d 1117, 1178 (1982); Pan v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004).
Compelling Arbitration under the MSA
Whether a contract compels arbitration is a question of contract interpretation but
Nevada’s public policy is to encourage arbitration.4  The MSA’s arbitration clause listed
controversies arising out of the payment adjustment based on a state’s enforcement of its
qualifying statute, among other things.  The State argues that the arbitration clause only applies
to controversies arising out of payment adjustments and does not apply to whether or not the
state has enforced its qualifying statute.  However because the arbitration clause does not limit
what type of claims are available for arbitration and the clause itself makes a reference to the
enforcement of qualifying statutes, the court held that the state did not overcome the presumption
in favor of arbitration.  Additionally, many jurisdictions have also held that under the MSA
whether a state has enforced its qualifying statute, is available for arbitration.5 
MSA Provision Giving State Courts Jurisdiction
The state argues that the MSA allows state courts to hear disputes arising under the MSA.
However, the provision of the MSA that allows this, excludes disputes that would fall under the
arbitration clause and excludes disputes concerning the payment adjustment caused by
enforcement of the state’s qualifying statute.  Therefore, the MSA ensures that when payments
are adjusted based on more than one state’s failure to enforce a qualifying statute, the MSA
tobacco companies will not have to defend lawsuits in each state they adjust their payment to
because these adjustments will often be nationwide. Thus, enforcement of the qualifying statute
does not fall under the state court’s jurisdiction. 
Conclusion
The court denied the writ of mandamus holding that a claim arising out of a payment
decrease based on the lack of enforcement of a qualifying statute shall go to arbitration instead of
through the state courts.  The MSA’s arbitration clause is not limited and alludes to qualifying
statute enforcement controversies.  Additionally, the MSA provision granting state courts
jurisdiction over certain controversies exclude a controversy over a payment decrease based on
the lack of enforcement of a qualifying statute. Therefore, under the MSA, the controversy shall
go to arbitration.
4 Clark Co. Pub. Employees v. Pearson, 106 Nev. 587, 590, 798 P.2d 136, 137 (1990); Phillips v. Parker, 106 Nev.
415, 417, 794 P.2d 716, 718 (1990).
5 People v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 865 N.E.2d 546, 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); State v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., _So.2d_,
2008 WL 821054 at *5 (Ala. 2008); State v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 905 A.2d 42, 51 (Conn. 2006); State, ex rel. Carter
v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Ieyoub v. Phillip Morris, USA, Inc., 982 So. 2d
296, 300 (La. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Phillip Morris, 944 A.2d 1167, 1182 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); State ex rel.,
Bruning v. R.J. Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d 672, 680 (Neb. 2008); State v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 927 A.2d 503, 509
(N.H. 2007); State ex rel. N.M. Att. Gen., 194 P.3d 749, 754 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Philip Morris Inc., 813
N.Y.S.2d 71, 76 (App. Div. 2006); State v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 666 S.E.2d 783, 792-93 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008);
State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 06AP-1012, 2008 WL 2854536, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App., July 24, 2008); State v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 945 A.2d 887, 892 (Vt. 2008).
